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In the USA, Species Conservation Banking is a prominent example of compensatory biodiversity 
impact mitigation, with an annual market value estimated at US$354.2 million. Species Conservation 
Banking represents a useful case study of a well-established program that can provide empirical 
insights into the practicalities of implementing quantitative compensatory biodiversity mitigation on-
the-ground.  
Using semi-structured key-informant interviews structured around well-established technical 
challenges to compensatory mitigation, this study aimed to understand i) how and why these 
challenges are or are not addressed in practice; and ii) how these challenges relate to practical 
challenges faced by conservation banking stakeholders on-the-ground. 
Challenges identified included: i) defining trading currencies and equivalence, ii) regulatory and 
political uncertainty, iii) regulatory agency capacity, will and knowledge, iv) lack of policies, 
standards, and competition with other mitigation mechanisms, v) long-term uncertainty/longevity, 
and vi) lack of species knowledge and data transparency. These challenges are numerous, diverse, 
interlinked and transdisciplinary, and collectively inhibit the ability of practitioners to resolve 
underlying technical challenges – a finding likely applicable to related biodiversity offset programs. 
To help address challenges and navigate this complexity, we formulate several recommendations for 
conservation banking stakeholders to improve the chances of beneficial biodiversity outcomes being 




Compensatory biodiversity mitigation is a mechanism designed to reduce the conflict between 
development and conservation goals by compensating for a development’s residual impacts on 
species and habitats, and is increasingly applied world-wide. In the United States of America (USA), a 
biodiversity banking industry worth approximately US$3.6 billion per annum has emerged, focused 
mainly on wetland mitigation driven by the Clean Water Act 1972 (Bennett et al. 2017). ‘Species 
Conservation Banking’ or ‘Conservation Banking’ has evolved from this concept and is one of 
multiple authorized mitigation mechanisms in the USA for mitigating impacts to species listed under 
the Endangered Species Act 1973 (ESA), with an annual market worth US$354.2 million (Bennett et 
al. 2017). 
Species Conservation Banking in the US is a mechanism by which a third party provides 
compensatory mitigation for impacts regulated by the US Endangered Species Act. An individual who 
owns land where an endangered species is present can establish a Species Conservation Bank (SCB) 
for the species, for which they are granted credits by either the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS) or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Once credits are granted, 
the land becomes a conservation bank, but credits are only granted on the condition that the land is 
managed for the conservation of the endangered species in perpetuity (Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005; 
Carroll et al. 2008). Credits can be purchased by developers who are required to offset impacts on a 
specific ESA-listed species (Figure 1). There are 154 SCBs registered in the US Regulatory In-lieu fee 
and Bank Information Tracking System (RIBITs) database, 72% of which are in California, but with 
others distributed across the USA focused on a limited, but expanding set of listed species (Gamarra 
& Toombs 2017). No ecological assessment of the effects of the conservation banking program on 
target species has been conducted, although habitat-level analysis shows Californian SCBs have 
significantly averted levels of natural habitat conversion that have occurred outside of banks. 
However, the same study showed banks prevented the passive restoration of degraded habitats 
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which has occurred outside banks – a finding potentially indicating perverse outcomes (Sonter et al. 
2019). 
Species Conservation Banking is often perceived as a species-focused form of biodiversity offsetting 
(McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; Bennett et al. 2017) as it bears much resemblance to the offsetting 
approach practiced in other countries. For example, it relies upon the same basic policy machinery 
which requires quantifiable and genuinely additional compensatory conservation benefits in 
response to specific development impacts. However Species Conservation Banking differs from 
offsetting in that a) there is no overall requirement for no-net-loss or net gain, as part of the broader 
mitigation hierarchy, and b) it is focused entirely on endangered species protected by law, rather 
than using species or habitats as a proxy for biodiversity in a broader sense. Protecting species does 
not necessarily result in protecting biodiversity more generally, but they are widely used in policy 
and legislation as a proxy for biodiversity as their protection requires the conservation of functioning 
ecosystems and the associated species and habitats.   
Despite the increased global application and several documented short-term successes of 
biodiversity offsetting (Rainey et al. 2015; zu Ermgassen et al. 2019), there are both technical and 
practical challenges associated with the approach (Bull et al. 2013; Maron et al. 2016), raising 
concerns about its ecological and social consequences (Walker et al. 2009; Bidaud et al. 2017). 
Technical challenges have been well documented and exemplified in the literature including 
difficulties quantifying biodiversity for trading, ensuring additionality or defining limits for what can 
be offset (e.g. Walker et al. 2009; Pilgrim et al. 2013; Sullivan 2013). For example, biodiversity 
offsetting in France requires demonstrated NNL of biodiversity, however data suggest that success 
has been limited (Bezombes et al. 2019), and a range of technical and practical challenges have 
influenced this outcome (Dauguet 2015; Guillet & Semal 2018). 
Due to the similarities to other offsetting programs, similar technical challenges are also faced by 
SCBs (Table 1; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; Gamarra & Toombs 2017). Gamarra & Toombs (2017) 
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found that although national standards are met well by SCBs (USFWS 2003), the same banks failed to 
meet many of the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP) offsetting principles. For 
example, as many of the banks set up are preservation banks (i.e. they preserve existing habitat), the 
additionality of gains is brought into question (Pawliczek & Sullivan 2011). It is important to note 
that banks are not legally required to meet these principles, but as these principles are often seen as 
best practice, failing to meet them risks negative ecological outcomes. 
A diverse and linked set of practical challenges faced by SCBs have been identified, which may hinder 
a banks’ intended implementation and functioning. These include: a lack of resources at regulatory 
agencies to set up conservation banking programs; high upfront costs to establish banks; difficulties 
with law enforcement of required mitigation; lack of empirical evidence supporting management of 
endangered species; the creation of a thin market for credits due to the species-specific focus of 
conservation banks; and the reliance of future funding (e.g. credit sales, interest on endowments) on 
economic conditions (e.g. Wilcove & Lee 2004; Bruggeman et al. 2005; Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005; 
Pawliczek & Sullivan 2011; DOI 2016; Ferreira & Ferreira 2018). Similar practical challenges are often 
faced by biodiversity offsets making it difficult to transition offsetting programs from policy to 
implementation. Some programs have remained nascent with few transactions (Bennett et al. 2017), 
while for others practical challenges during implementation (e.g. politics, market factors, 
stakeholder values) have complicated the efforts to compensate for impacts (Robertson 2009; 
Brownlie et al. 2017; Carver & Sullivan 2017). For example, in the UK the use of biodiversity metrics 
was hindered by stakeholder pressure to save money and decrease the value of calculations (Carver 
& Sullivan 2017). In the USA wetland mitigation banking is highly influenced by changes in the 
regulatory setting which drives credit demand, and where project delays can result from differing 
viewpoints on risks and income (Robertson 2009). 
Practical challenges are often linked, transdisciplinary and formed as a result of conservation 
interventions being implemented in dynamic social-ecological systems where stakeholders have 
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diverse perspectives and values. This is exemplified by Pawliczek & Sullivan (2011) who describe the 
enabling policies and governance frameworks that have allowed SCBs in the USA to proliferate, but 
also describe some of the linked challenges that have emerged. Such situations present high levels of 
uncertainty in decision-making, which can hinder efforts to achieve positive conservation outcomes 
in practice (Regan et al. 2002; Knight et al. 2019) 
Although there is currently no formal requirement for NNL to be achieved by SCBs (Bunn et al. 
2014), the USFWS Mitigation Policy (USFWS 2016) looked likely to introduce an overall mitigation 
planning goal of a ‘net conservation gain’ into regulation. However, this was rescinded by the USFWS 
in July 2018, returning the former regulations and guidance back into force (USFWS 2018). On top of 
these policy movements, multiple actors are working to improve SCBs, or develop new mitigation 
mechanisms for endangered species (e.g. Kreuter et al. 2017; Chiavacci & Pindilli 2018) aiming to 
tackle some of the challenges faced by the offsetting approach. To achieve net gain, or a similar 
target, would require many of the challenges of offsetting (Table 1) and practical challenges faced on 
the ground to be tackled.  
Conservation banking provides a useful case study of a well-established mechanism that can provide 
insights into the practical challenges of designing, implementing and seeking to improve biodiversity 
impact mitigation on the ground. Using similar interview and thematic analysis methodologies used 
to investigate other offsetting programs  (e.g. Sullivan & Hannis 2015; Maestre-Andrés et al. 2020), 
we reviewed the implementation of SCBs and interviewed stakeholders to understand their 
perspectives on the technical and practical challenges faced by SCBs including: 
1. How and why identified technical challenges in biodiversity offsetting (Table 1) are, or are 
not, addressed and overcome by SCBs; and 
2. Further challenges perceived to prevent the functioning and implementation of effective 
SCBs in practice.   
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Doing so, will help advance an understanding of conservation banking as a mechanism for ensuring 
the persistence of biodiversity, and of the situations and broader systemic contexts that promote 
practical and technical challenges in designing, implementing and improving conservation banking. 
This study also helps to identify points of intervention where challenges are yet to be tackled. 
Overcoming and tackling these challenges has potential to advance the effectiveness, cost-efficiency 
and equity of SCBs for delivering positive conservation outcomes for endangered species.   
 
Methods 
Developing an Interview Protocol 
An interview protocol was developed to guide semi-structured interviews with individuals involved 
in SCBs (Supporting Information). The questionnaire comprised three sections addressing: 1) the SCB 
process and the participant’s role; 2) how, why and where identified technical challenges in 
offsetting processes are, or are not, addressed by SCBs (Table 1); and 3) challenges that exist in 
practice. As SCBs encounter many similar challenges to biodiversity offsetting, and may one day be 
required to incorporate a NNL or better objective (a key component of offsetting programs), Section 
2 of the protocol was framed around commonly identified challenges of offsetting (Table 1) and 
promoted discussion as to how and why each of these challenges were addressed. Section 3 allowed 
scope for participants to raise other challenges or topics important to them in practice. The protocol 
was reviewed by all authors and trialed with colleagues familiar with the conservation banking 
approach before the commencement of interviews. Participants were encouraged to speak openly 
about their experiences, knowledge and perspectives.  
Identifying and Interviewing Participants 
To be included as a ‘key-informant’, individuals had to have had multiple years’ experience working 
on SCBs at multiple sites within the USA, and/or oversight of the mechanism at a national scale, be 
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over the age of 18 and English-speaking. The first four key-informants were identified through 
recommendations from T.P.T. In small, well-connected social networks, such as the SCB industry, 
snowball sampling can create exhaustive sampling frames, and we used this approach to identify the 
subsequent key-informants  (Bernard 2006). Within the sampling frame identified (41 individuals), 
we contacted 37 individuals using purposive sampling to ensure representation of different 
stakeholder groups (Figure 1). 
Between June and August 2018, T.B.W. conducted and audio recorded 19 initial interviews using 
online audio or video call software (Stage 1), with two further interviews conducted in September 
2018 due to the participant’s availability (Stage 2). Interviews lasted between 36 min and 105 min 
with an average duration of 62 min. Participants comprised six regulatory agency staff, four 
practitioners, three non-regulatory government staff, two developers, two NGO staff, and four 
individuals having experience in multiple roles including research. Participants were based in nine 
different states, including states with and without SCBs (Figure 2). The majority of interviews 
covered all topics in the interview guide, although some interviews were limited by time constraints. 
The number of interviews was limited by the available research timeframe. During the latter 
interviews many of the same participants were recommended and convergence emerged on several 
themes.  
Recordings were transcribed utilizing the transcription tool ‘Temi’ (https://www.temi.com). 
Transcripts were manually reviewed by T.B.W. to ensure transcription accuracy.  
Thematic Analysis 
Data from Stage 1 interviews were analyzed following The Framework Approach (Ritchie & Spencer 
1994; Gale et al. 2013), a thematic analysis comprising five main steps: familiarization with the data, 
development of a thematic framework, coding of the data using this framework, organizing the 
coded data into charts, and finally interpretation. Firstly, a random subset of seven transcripts (38%) 
were selected from which an understanding of participants perspectives could be derived. Recurring 
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themes and sub-themes were identified and used for development of a thematic framework which 
was used to code the transcripts from all interviews in ‘Nvivo 12 Pro’ (QSR International Pty Ltd.). To 
ensure validity of the thematic framework and coding, an external researcher reviewed the 
framework and transcripts (Supporting Information).  
For the thematic framework, seven themes were predefined based on the technical challenges of 
offsetting outlined in Table 1, allowing us to tackle our first research question (Bull et al. 2013). An 
inductive approach was used to identify both sub-themes within these themes, and all other broad 
themes that emerged from the data (Gale et al. 2013). This inductive approach was important as it 
allowed us to identify those challenges raised as important by the interviewees without biasing 
results by defining all themes prior to the analysis (e.g. Sullivan & Harris 2015). To synthesize key 
findings, we identified a subset of all themes, based on i) the quantity of coded data, and ii) 
relevance to the research questions, to take forward for charting. Charting involved separating the 
coded data by theme and displaying data on each theme categorized by stakeholder groups and sub-
themes. These charts present the data analyzed for this study. Data from Stage 2 interviews were 
coded using the thematic framework developed from Stage 1, and any new themes or sub-themes 
identified added to the thematic framework. To acknowledge the subjectivity of this method, an 
observational standpoint (Clark 2002) was undertaken (Supporting Information). 
 
Results 
Themes and Codes 
Twenty-one themes were identified from the Stage 1 interview transcripts. Seven of these themes 
were classified as ‘challenges to offsetting’ (following the challenges shown in Table 1), the remaining 
12 were identified as practical challenges and uncertainties. Seven priority themes were selected for 
charting and are reported here. Coding of transcripts from Stage 2 of the interview process revealed 
11 
 
no new themes to add to the framework. Direct quotes from participants which are representative of 
themes are presented in Table 2. A complete list of themes, two example thematic charts, and an 
expanded table of quotes are provided in the Supporting Information.  
Addressing Offsetting Challenges  
Currency and Equivalence  
Participants across the stakeholder groups stated that most banks use an acre-based approach for 
credit calculation. The interviews highlighted a difference in opinion regarding the adequacy of these 
measures. Practitioners and some agency staff advocated for the use of these relatively simple and 
easy-to-use metrics (Quote 1A). Other agency staff, NGOs and some non-regulatory agency staff 
would have liked to see more ecologically-meaningful metrics incorporating habitat quality and 
other aspects of endangered species ecology, to increase the likelihood of positive conservation 
outcomes and equivalence being achieved (Quote 1B). This difference of opinion was underlain by a 
broad appreciation of the need to trade-off the complexity of the crediting approaches against the 
practicality of being able to apply the survey methods in the field. Most practitioners, and some 
participants in multiple roles, perceived that methods deemed too complex caused delays in bank 
approvals, greater perceived financial risk and ultimately reduced investment (Quote 1C).  
Perceptions varied regarding achieving equivalence between impact and credit sites. Many 
regulatory agency staff and participants with multiple roles stated that methods used for 
determining credits and debits were the same. However, other regulatory agency staff outlined this 
wasn’t always achieved in practice. Some practitioners and NGO staff highlighted the difference 
between credit and debit methodologies as a key challenge for SCBs.   
Longevity  
Through a combination of land use restrictions (i.e. conservation easements), long-term 
management plans and financial instruments (i.e. endowment funds), participants generally agreed 
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that the long-term commitments required by the USFWS are adequate, or at least better than 
alternative mitigation mechanisms, for ensuring the persistence of endangered species in perpetuity 
(Quote 2A). However, some participants across stakeholder groups perceived the high and uncertain 
costs of perpetual management as a challenge (e.g. endowments; Quote 2B). Most non-regulatory 
government participants, some regulatory agency staff, a developer and a practitioner expressed 
concern that the system does not account for events outside of the banker’s control, such as climate 
change-driven habitat changes within bank boundaries and shifts in species distributions, or force-
majeure events (Quote 2C). For example, climate change may render a bank unsuitable for its 
endangered species and therefore remove a bank’s credit generation potential.  
Practical Challenges and Uncertainties  
Regulatory and Political Uncertainty 
The dependence of the market for SCB credits on regulatory drivers was a challenge perceived by 
most participants (Quote 3A). Future demand for credits is influenced by changes in policy, 
legislation, regulations and guidance, and the interpretation and enforcement of these by regulatory 
agencies. Participants across all stakeholder groups identified the current US political context, 
specifically the weakening of environmental laws and potential changes in the requirements for 
mitigation, as leading to increased uncertainty in the market, and hence reduced demand for species 
credits (Quote 3B).  
Many government employees, practitioners and developers outlined the importance of: i) state 
legislation and policy in driving SCBs; and ii) the importance of an accepting political context for their 
proliferation. Both conditions were perceived as present in California, but not in other states, 




Regulatory Agency Capacity, Will and Knowledge  
The capacity of regulatory agencies to implement conservation banking programs was identified as 
challenging. Many agency staff and developers suggested that a lack of staff, time and financial 
resources led to difficulties maintaining oversight of banks and delays in bank approval times (Quote 
4A). Some practitioners, agency staff, developers and NGO staff perceived a lack of knowledge 
within some sections of regulating agencies, specifically regarding how to establish banks, and also a 
lack of will to do so in some regions where regulatory agency staff did not feel comfortable with the 
approach, or did not have the resources to implement it. A lack of knowledge of conservation 
banking, and willingness to implement them, was perceived as a primary reason why banks are more 
common in some states than in others (Quotes 4B). A few participants, including researcher and 
non-regulatory government individuals, highlighted that knowledge and the drive for innovation to 
set up banks was often driven by one or a few key individuals in a specific state. 
Some participants from across the stakeholder groups outlined that ambiguous interpretations of 
policies and guidance by different regulatory agency offices created inconsistencies in perceived 
mitigation requirements, inconsistencies in how mitigation was conducted, which was perceived to 
drive uncertainty in demand for credits. This was identified by both practitioners and agency staff as 
a reason for the variable number of banks between states and regions (Quote 4C).  
Policies, Standards and Competition 
Participants across several stakeholder groups, apart from developers, perceived that uncertainty in 
future demand and in how conservation banking is implemented is increased by the absence of 
policies and standards applicable to conservation banks (Quote 5A). A broader challenge was a 
perceived lack of standards applicable to all types of mitigation (Quote 5B). Some participants 
perceived that banks were often held to a higher standard than other mitigation mechanisms (e.g. 
permittee responsible mitigation), and regulatory agencies did not show preference for the advance 
mitigation offered by SCBs, allowing it to be undercut by other mitigation mechanisms perceived as 
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less stringent and delivering fewer positive conservation outcomes. This was referred to as “leaky 
demand” and created uncertainty in the future demand for credits (Quote 5C).  
Species Knowledge and Data Transparency 
Several government staff, NGOs, practitioners and researchers, were concerned about a lack of 
biological information and knowledge of endangered species targeted by conservation banks, which 
made managing habitat for those species difficult and uncertain, as actions could not be founded 
upon evidence. Several agency staff, NGOs and practitioners expressed concern about the absence 
of species mitigation guidelines for species not previously addressed through banks, where a 
difficulty in the design and implementation of banks was not knowing how to create and manage a 
bank for a specific species (Quote 6A). These challenges were underlain by the innate complexity of 
the suite of species targeted by SCBs, each of which had specific habitat requirements and threats, 
making the application of general rules and guidance difficult (Quote 6B).  
A small number of participants, from across stakeholder groups, identified the lack of transparency 
in much of the data collected by banks, and the inadequacy of the available information, hindered 
research to determine the ecological and economic outcomes of conservation banking (Quote 6C).  
Complex Systems  
An overarching challenge identified by several participants, particularly practitioners, is that SCBs 
and the social-ecological systems in which they operate are complex, dynamic and diverse, which 
produces multiple sources of uncertainty (Quotes 7A, 7B). 
Participants in all stakeholder groups, recognized that this complexity necessitates repeated trade-
offs between practicality and comprehensiveness. On the one hand, participants realized an easy to 
use, simple, operational approach facilitates implementation of banks, but on the other, an 
approach needs to be sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the requirements of endangered 
species being targeted and the intricacies of the socio-economic context that manifests pressure on 
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these species. This trade-off was identified for crediting techniques, with monitoring requirements, 
adequate levels of science and in the development of bank implementation guidelines (Quote 7C). 
 
Discussion  
Few studies have investigated the functioning of, and perceived challenges faced by, SCBs (e.g. Fox & 
Nino-Murcia 2005; DOI 2013, 2016; Gamarra & Toombs 2017; Sonter et al. 2019) and this is the first 
study to have examined the practical experiences of a diverse range of SCB stakeholders. We found 
Species Conservation Banks present as complex systems, being highly dynamic, comprising diverse 
and ever-changing ecological and socio-political situations typically involving multiple species, and 
stakeholders with diverse values, perspectives, attitudes and behaviors which interact in often 
unpredictable ways (Brownlee 2007; DeFries & Nagendra 2017). This complexity was identified as a 
challenge by participants and is perhaps the most fundamental challenge facing those designing and 
implementing SCBs (e.g. Miller 2013) as it leads to a diverse, transdisciplinary set of challenges 
manifesting high uncertainty whilst attempting to navigate trade-offs between practicality and 
comprehensiveness – a state common to many conservation programs (see Catalano et al. 2019 for 
a review). Similar findings have been observed for wetland mitigation banking in the USA which 
needed to align various economic, ecological and regulatory agendas, navigate trade-offs between 
comprehensiveness and practicality (Robertson 2004, 2009) and ensure that “policy must attend to, 
rather than ignore, contingency, complexity and unpredictability in the application of market-based 
policy principles” (Robertson 2009). Given this complexity, a clear typology of the institutional and 





Challenges and Uncertainties 
Complexity presents a set of practical challenges perceived by participants to inhibit the design, 
implementation, effectiveness and proliferation of SCBs. These challenges include: 1) the reliance of 
the market on enforced, stable regulatory structures; 2) heterogenous levels of access to 
information and knowledge about, and management requirements of, endangered species; 3) lack 
of regulatory agency capacity; 4) lack of data for evaluation; and 5) regular trade-offs between 
comprehensiveness and practicality. These findings align with previous studies (e.g. Mills 2003; Fox 
& Nino-Murcia 2005; Pawliczek & Sullivan 2011; Bowers 2017; Gamarra & Toombs 2017), but this 
study provides greater resolution of these perceived challenges, notably the different values, 
perspectives and attitudes across diverse stakeholder groups whose ability and willingness to 
collaborate underpins the effectiveness of SCBs (as it does with many conservation projects; 
Catalano et al. 2019). 
There are well characterized technical challenges facing offsetting programs (Bull et al. 2013), some 
of which participants perceived to be well addressed by their programs, including managing sites for 
conservation in perpetuity and monitoring and evaluation requirements (not reported in this study), 
which is consistent with a recent review (Gamarra & Toombs 2017). However, regarding long-term 
positive conservation outcomes, there is a broadly perceived uncertainty in funding for 
management, and uncertainty about how banks meet their responsibilities when events beyond 
their control pose challenges. These challenges may be common for SCBs generally (e.g. Whipps 
2015) as they are thought to be with other site-specific conservation mechanisms, such as protected 
areas (Mascia et al. 2014) and Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (Wells & Brandon 
1992). 
Conversely, the use of appropriate currencies for calculating the credit numbers was perceived to be 
less effectively addressed. Similar to findings for wetland mitigation banking (Robertson 2004), 
opinions differed as to the most effective methods, which was complicated  by an appreciation of 
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the need to trade-off a method’s comprehensiveness (which recognizes the situational complexity; 
sensu Tinbergen 1952; Young et al. 1996) against the need for pragmatism (where practicality and 
simplicity are essential for effective implementation; Peirce 1878; Knight et al. 2013). Area based 
metrics are most frequently used but raise challenges regarding equivalence (Pawliczek & Sullivan 
2011). Several crediting methods are now available (Chiavacci & Pindilli 2018), with some attempting 
to more meaningfully address the ecological characteristics of SCB sites (e.g. Bruggeman et al. 2005; 
Searcy & Shaffer 2008). However, without agreement between developers, practitioners, 
researchers and agency and NGO staff as to the level of comprehensiveness required to address 
social-ecological complexity, and acknowledgement that pragmatic processes will be fundamental 
for SCBs to operate effectively, new metrics may have limited effectiveness.  
Efforts to address the technical challenges of offsetting, such as determining meaningful biodiversity 
metrics, or ensuring longevity of outcomes, are linked to the practical challenges of implementing 
mitigation on-the-ground, which are dependent on the economic, political and social context of 
individual banks. Without a detailed and nuanced understanding of social-ecological context, and 
effectively addressing practical design and implementation challenges, the market may struggle to 
grow, and the many technical challenges, such as those identified by Bull et al (2013), remain 
insoluble.  
For example, addressing deficiencies in crediting methods may increase the likelihood of NNL being 
achieved, but this will achieve little if a bank cannot sell credits, which may depend on regulatory 
agency staff opinions, policy reform, economic growth rates, species ecology, climate change 
predictions, monitoring and evaluation effectiveness, endowment fund growth and competition 
from other mitigation mechanisms. Poor understanding of the social-ecological context, and the 
associated linked practical challenges, runs the risks of generating unintended ecological 
consequences, perhaps similar to the prevention of natural habitat gains recently identified (Sonter 
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et al. 2019), or unexpected social impacts such as the accumulation of conservation-related wealth 
by large land-owners (Pawliczek & Sullivan 2011).  
Participants identified the reliance of the markets on regulation and policy and the uncertainty 
generated by political changes as a key challenge. In 2018, the political context in the USA was 
perceived as posing difficulties for the conservation banking industry, where weakening of the ESA 
mitigation requirements could cause a decline in the demand for endangered species credits. As US 
banks are largely privately owned, their profit depends on the stable regulatory context, perhaps 
making the program’s success more vulnerable to shifts in regulation or policy than in programs 
where banks are publicly owned. Part way through this research, the 2016 Compensatory Mitigation 
Policy was rescinded by the USFWS (USFWS 2018). The 2016 policy would have established a goal of 
‘net gain’ for endangered species mitigation initiatives. Previous studies found practitioners 
generally supported: 1) the introduction of equivalent standards for different permitted mitigation 
mechanisms; 2) a policy preference for conservation banks; and 3) formal conservation banking 
regulations. Agency staff were, however, opposed to a stated preference for banks over other forms 
of mitigation (DOI 2013, 2016). In this study, not all participants expressed support for the 
introduction of a conservation banking policy, but many sought certainty in the regulatory context, 
which would likely have been compromised by proposed changes to environmental legislation and 
the lack of consistent guidelines for implementing endangered species mitigation, be it through 
conservation banking or other mechanisms. Our study aligns with previous ones that highlighted the 
influence of economic, political and social context and uncertainty on the effectiveness and 
proliferation of biodiversity banking (Robertson 2004; Calvet et al. 2015). These factors possibly 
obstruct the proliferation of conservation banks.   
Implications for Offsetting   
In the offsetting literature, there is a push towards addressing the many technical challenges posed 
by the offsetting approach (Maron et al. 2016; Gamarra & Toombs 2017). We have found that whilst 
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some of the technical challenges of offsetting are well addressed by conservation banking, in 
practice, they are underlain by a diverse set of practical challenges which themselves are difficult to 
solve, and whose solving precedes the effective implementation of technical matters. This finding 
may be applicable to offsetting programs more generally. 
For example in the United Kingdom, a pilot biodiversity offsetting initiative was met by vocal 
opposition, diverse value positions, delays in implementation, and a perception that socio-economic 
factors compromised the technical specifications of the offsets (e.g. metrics, equivalent gains) 
(Sullivan & Hannis 2015; Carver & Sullivan 2017). Similar practical challenges were faced by the 
French offsetting program, limiting success in achieving NNL (Guillet & Semal 2018; Bezombes et al. 
2019). In South Africa, offsetting has been integrated into the environmental impact assessment 
process but faces a diverse range of implementation challenges including inconsistent offset 
requirements due to an absence of clear policy, limited government capacity, information and 
knowledge, and inconsistent decision-making and enforcement of offset decisions (Brownlie et al. 
2017). In Spain disagreements over the concept of NNL, concerns over government capacity, data 
availability and metrics have led to large delays in the production of habitat banking guidance 
(Maestre-Andrés et al. 2020). 
 
Future Opportunities for Navigating Complexity 
Compensatory mitigation programs present a diverse set of challenges, varying in their tractability 
(Maron et al. 2016), creating situations with high levels of uncertainty and complexity where there 
are often no clear solutions to achieving intended ecological outcomes. In these situations, 
refinements to, and creation of new mixes of, mechanisms may produce unintended negative 
outcomes (Rittel & Webber 1973). The design, implementation and adaptive improvement of 
compensatory mitigation programs need to address both practical and technical challenges, whilst 
being mindful of social-ecological context and the system’s complexity.  
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Our study highlighted differences in values between groups of stakeholders on key challenges faced 
by offsetting programs, which must be navigated for effective implementation of compensatory 
mitigation. Stakeholders with a common interest in functional, effective and profitable SCB 
initiatives can collectively undertake a boundary critique (Ulrich and Reynolds 2010) ahead of 
designing an SCB program to generate a common understanding (e.g. mental model; Biggs et al. 
2011) of the situation in which a SCB is to be established. This common understanding will be useful 
when developing conservation banks, policies, conservation banking and species mitigation 
guidance, to design and change programs in a mutually agreeable direction. Accounting for 
confounding complexity during implementation necessitates rapid learning, which may be most 
profitably undertaken as small, incremental improvements to SCBs, where there are risks with 
oversimplifying a solution (McCarthy & Possingham 2007; DeFries & Nagendra 2017), and by 
grappling with, and learning from, the failures that will inevitably occur. This requires implementing 
simple systems within organizations and teams that are designed cognizant of stakeholder’s 
mindsets (Catalano et al. 2018).  
The tools and principles from the transdisciplines of evaluation and systems thinking (e.g. boundary 
critiques, multi-criteria decision analysis) may be particularly relevant to establishing effective SCBs, 
as both could help design solutions that can address the complexity and linked set of technical and 
practical challenges that arise (see Knight et al. 2019). By understanding system complexity, one 
could make changes to SCB that ‘fit’ more effectively within the economic, political and social 
contexts to allow beneficial outcomes for endangered species to be secured.  
Secondly, provision of a policy, or at least strengthened guidelines for the compensatory mitigation 
of individual species, may increase certainty in the market and address some of the practical 
challenges identified. This could help establish greater clarity of policy and requirements for banks, 
reduce uncertainty in demand, and ensure different types of mitigation are held to the same 
standards. Lastly, the collection and better centralization of ecological (including baselines and 
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counterfactuals) and economic data, information and knowledge on SCBs and impact sites may 
facilitate decision-making and research into the ecological and economic outcomes of conservation 
banking (Gamarra & Toombs 2017; Sonter et al. 2019).  
Conclusion 
Over the last 40 years, SCBs have developed a suite of concepts, tools, methods and mechanisms to 
more effectively manage the economic, ecological, political, social and regulatory components of 
these systems (Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005; Gamarra & Toombs 2017). Despite struggling to gather 
momentum in some states and challenges with the current approach, SCB is a highly developed 
compensatory mitigation mechanism, increasingly used across the USA, providing private 
landowners with an incentive to conserve endangered species on their properties. As the new 
administration promises sweeping changes to environmental protections in the US, addressing the 
practical challenges identified in this study will likely help minimize uncertainties in these complex 
systems, and ultimately assist these programs to more effectively mitigate impacts to endangered 
species in the USA.   
The challenges identified here, are complex, diverse, dynamic and generating high uncertainty – 
making them difficult to address in practice, and necessitating regular trade-offs between 
comprehensiveness and pragmatism. This is a likely characteristic of offsetting strategies generally, 
noticeable where practical challenges have often left programs struggling to gain momentum, even 
in the USA where these approaches have been developing for over 30 years. Embracing this 
complexity, as well as the challenges associated with it, may provide us with better ways of 
designing and addressing offsetting programs in the future.   
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Description (Bull et al, 2013) Reported Practice 
Measuring 
Biodiversity 
Choosing a currency for 
measuring biodiversity. In the 
case of SCBs, these are the 
metrics used for the calculation 
of species’ credits and debits. 
70% of conservation banks reported using 
a 1 credit = 1 acre approach, and only 13% 
included a measure of habitat quality in 
credit calculation (Gamarra & Toombs 
2017).  
None of the conservation banks reported 
on the quantification of losses and gains of 
biodiversity (Gamarra & Toombs 2017).  
Equivalency 
Ensuring equivalence in 
biodiversity value between the 
credit and debit sites.  
NNL 
A requirement to demonstrate 
no net loss of biodiversity occurs 
overall. 
No net loss is not an objective of the 
program, but no net loss / net gain is 
included in 6% of banking agreements 
(Gamarra & Toombs 2017).  
Long-Term 
Management of the site in 
perpetuity for the endangered 
species being protected. 
All conservation banks are established in 
perpetuity through a legal mechanism, all 
require monitoring of the offset area in 
banking agreements, and most have 
endowment funds for long-term financing 
(Caroll et al 2008; Gamarra & Toombs 
2017).  A recent habitat level analysis 
indicated potential perverse ecological 





Managing for uncertainties 
throughout the compensation 
process. 
12% of banks reported using mitigation 
ratios; performance standards are used 
that must be met in order to obtain 
credits; 74% reported the use of adaptive 
management procedures (Gammara & 
Toombs 2017) 
Limits/Thresholds 
Defining limits to what can be 
offset through the conservation 
banking process 
Limits are considered by 18% of 
conservation banks documentation 
(Gamarra & Toombs 2017). 
Monitoring 
Monitoring the transaction and 
progress of the conservation 
bank. 
In conservation banking agreements, all 
(bar three) required the conservation bank 




Table 2 Representative quotes from key-informants.  
Theme*: 
(1) Currency & Equivalence (2) Longevity  (3) Regulatory and Political Uncertainty  
(4) Regulatory Agency 
Capacity, Will and 
Knowledge 
1A, PRC - “It is a topic of spirited 
debate amongst many 
conservation stakeholders and I 
believe that the key thing is to 
have something that's simple, 
functional, repeatable - that can 
deliver a benefit to the species."   
 
1B, NGO - "With the amount of 
data collection possible today, I 
think that banks could do a much 
better job of including functional 
metrics of habitats and some are, 
but I think that is an opportunity 
that must be pursued."  
 
1C, REG “I’ve seen them go way 
too complicated trying to, you 
know, know every single little 
part of the life history of the 
species into a credit methodology 
that doesn't, that may not work. 
I've seen way too simple or it's 
just like so many acres is a credit 
and not really paying too much 
attention to the quality behind 
those."  
2A, REG "it's important to me to keep in 
mind or maybe helps me sleep at night, you 
know, to, to consider whether conservation 
banks do a better job of that than the other 
mitigation options do. It's hard to do a 
perfect job of that. You know, how you 
ensure that something's going to be a 
particular way forever is kind of an 
impossible job to begin with. We do it the 
best we can. The best we know how, and I 
think conservation banks do it better than 
just about any other mitigation approach 
does.”  
 
2B, PRC "those [long term] requirements 
start to swing the financial feasibility of the 
bank projects.” 
 
2C, NRG "If you put a bank on the ground 
there may not be any development 
encroaching on that bank right now. But … 
in, 20, 30 years that bank might be 
threatened with encroachment by non-
suitable habitat. Some species might not be 
adversely affected by that. Other ones that 
are really sensitive to things happening in 
the landscape scale might be. My 
3A, OTH "From the point of view of the 
banker the key uncertainty is whether 
there will be buyers for credits. The 
banker is totally dependent on 
enforcement of the regulatory program 
to generate demand for credits. And in 
the US at least, enforcement of the 
Endangered Species Act has been 
episodic, irregular, unpredictable, not as 
rigorous as bankers might wish it to be 
in order for their investments to be 
relatively secure.” 
 
3B, REG " I think there's a lot of 
uncertainty in the banking world about 
what, um, the federal government's 
view of conservation banking and 
mitigation offsets is going to be in this 
administration, the level of support, the 
level of staff involvement. I think that's 
been creating some uncertainty as 
well.”  
 
3C, OTH "I worked very hard in the state 
of [specific state], which is extremely 
conservative, trying to push off, push off 
as banks in the state where there's been 
4A, REG "our funding has 
remained flat for - relatively flat 
- for a long time, and we are 
one of the smaller federal 
agencies and one of the less 
funded. So it does make it 
difficult."  
 
4B, OTH "Well, why not 
conservation banks? Well, when 
we called up one particular 
agency in [specific state] and 
they said, well, we already have 
an established in lieu fee 
program and we would not be 
interested in approving a 
conservation bank at this time."  
 
4C PRC “There is tremendous 
variability within field offices 
and tremendous variability 
within regions. 1) determining 
mitigation, 2) coming up with 
methodologies, and then 3) 
coming up with approaches on 
land tenureship”  
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 understanding is I don't know how that is 
incorporated in banking and I don’t think it 
is."  
 
this interface between the need to 
develop and need to conserve. But 
again, some states just don't have the 
regulatory side of It to help push federal 
regulation along.”  
 
Theme:  
(5) Policies, Standards and Competition  (6) Species Knowledge & Data Transparency (7) Complex System 
 
5A, PRC "without that document that says if you're 
going to use mitigation for species x, it has to have 
these things, no exceptions. Without that then you 
have conservation stakeholders often fighting 
against each other instead of working 
collaborative with each other.” 
 
5B, NGO "The other challenge that I see, is the 
competition that banks face from even less 
rigorous mitigation standards, or forms of 
mitigation. The in-lieu fee programs that you can 
basically buy credits from an in-lieu fee program 
before any mitigation is done on the ground."  
 
5C, OTH "there can be what some of the mitigation 
bankers call leaky demand meaning the entire 
business model is based on having regulatory 
demand for a product – a unit of restoration of 
habitat. But if the regulators do not accept that. 
And instead say, you know, ‘this company can do a 
little restoration on their own land’ instead of 
getting a credit in the mitigation bank or ‘this 
company can, you know what, just pay to have the 
 
6A, NGO "the USFWS doesn't have a really 
strong track record of proactively issuing 
mitigation guidance for individual species… [if 
such guidance is available (e.g. in mitigation 
banking)], you get a pretty clear sense of how 
credits and debits are going to be assessed 
 
6B, OTH "I think wetland banking is a little 
different because it's relatively similar across 
the country, but for each species they have their 
own unique threats, habitat needs and life 
cycles and things like that. So they're each 
going to have a unique set of activities that can, 
kind of, create that ecological uplift. But 
figuring out what it is and how you do it. You 
know, that's, that's a challenge…”  
 
6C, NGO “I was shocked by how little 
transparency there is and how the overall 
program works. And, um, you know, there's not 
even a basic understanding of how prevalent 
impacts are, how prevalent it is that 
compensatory mitigation happens, just that 
7A, PRC "details matter in these programs and 
there's very few people on planet earth that 
understand how to connect all these details. If you 
don't connect just one detail in your design… You get 
outcomes that are unintended, unintended 
consequences in conservation."  
 
7B, PRC "And a lot of people who run these, who 
create these systems do not have the experience. And 
they may have money behind them. They may be 
really great biologists. You have to have all these 
different skillsets, business, conservation biology, 
industry, legal, and there's just literally, there's very 
few people on this whole planet who could have 
done this and that's why you keep having these 
failures of these new ideas."  
 
7C, PRC "I'm not opposed to having more complex 
systems if they can be proven to be functional and 
deliver real outputs on the ground and all the things 
I'm talking about. The challenge I see with them is 
that today I don’t see the complexity creating any 
additional value or conservation on the ground or to 
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agency do some research’, then you, you're 
weakening the demand, for doing entrepreneurial 
or larger scale restoration."  
 
basic level understanding… the agencies just 
don't have the tracking tools that they need.”  
attract private investors into the space or to get 
industry change."  
*text in square brackets has removed the participants original wording to remove sources of identification, or wording been changed to allow the quote to 
be understood standalone. PRC = practitioner, NGO = non-government organization, NRG = non-regulatory government department, REG = regulatory 




Figure 1: A conceptual model of a Species Conservation Bank showing the interrelationships between 2 





Figure 2 The number of (a) Species Conservation Banks; and (b) participants in this study, as defined 5 
by their primary work location, per state in the USA. The number of Species Conservation Banks 6 
totaled 144 and participants 21. Note that although an individual was identified as based in a specific 7 
state, many had experience on a multi-state or national level, hence the large number of participants 8 
based in Washington, D.C. and Maryland. Data downloaded from RIBITS (Data downloaded: May, 9 
2018). Projection: EPSG:4269  10 
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Figure Legends 11 
Figure 1: A conceptual model of a Species Conservation Bank program showing the interrelationships 12 
between different stakeholder groups. 13 
Figure 2 The number of (a) Species Conservation Banks; and (b) participants in this study, as defined 14 
by their primary work location, per state in the USA. The number of Species Conservation Banks 15 
totaled 144 and participants 21. Note that although an individual was based in a specific state, many 16 
had experience implementing on a multi-state or national level, hence the large number of 17 
participants based in Washington, D.C. and Maryland. Data downloaded from RIBITS (Data 18 
downloaded: May, 2018). Projection: EPSG:4269. 19 
